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Abstract 
k-Anonymity protects privacy by ensuring that data can- 
not be linked to a single individual. In a k-anonymous 
dataset, any ident~fying information occurs in at least k 
tuples. Much research has been done to modify a single 
table dataset to satisfy anonymity constraints. This paper 
extends the dejinitions of k-anonymity to multiple relations 
and shows that previously proposed methodologies either fail 
to protect privacy, or overly reduce the utility of the data, in a 
multiple relation setting. We also propose m o  new clustering 
algorithms to achieve multirelational anonymity. Experiments 
show the effectiveness of the approach in terms of utility and 
efficiency. 
Index Terms-Privacy, Relational database, Security, in- 
tegrity, and protection 
Note to reviewers: A preliminary version of this pa- 
per appeared as a Jive page poster paper at ICDE 2007: 
http://dx.doi.org/l0.1109/lCDE.2007.369025 This submission 
includes additional discussion of the problems of single-table 
anonymization approaches, proofs of correctness, complexity 
discussion, a more efficient approximation evaluation, and 
empirical evaluation that did not appear in the ICDE poster 
paper: 
I. Introduction 
The tension between the value of using personal data 
for research, and concern over individual privacy, is ever- 
increasing. Simply removing uniquely identifying informa- 
tion (SSN, name) from data is not sufficient to prevent 
identification because partially identifying information (quasi- 
identifiers; age, sex, city . . .) can still be mapped to individ- 
uals using publicly available knowledge [19]. Table I shows 
one such example where an attacker, by using a public dataset, 
can map the names of the students to the sensitive GPA 
information, even though the released private table does not 
This material is based upon work supported by the National Science 
Foundation under Grant No. 0428168. 
disclose the names of the students. (E.g., a student with age 
"18", sex "M" and city "Lafayette" has GPA "2.34". Luke is 
the only person with these attributes in the public dataset.) 
k-Anonymity[l6] is one technique to protect against the 
linkage and identification of records. In a k-anonymous table, 
each distinct tuple in the projection over quasi-identifier 
attributes occurs at least k times. Private tables are k- 
anonymized by the use of generalizations and suppressions, 
with the result having two key properties: 
In the anonymous dataset, an individual can only be 
linked to a group of at least k private entities. 
Every tuple of the anonymous dataset correctly repre- 
sents a unique tuple in the private dataset (There is no 
false or noisy information.) 
Table I shows a 2-anonymization of the above mentioned 
private table. Given the 2-anonymized table, an attacker can 
at best link Luke into GPAs "3.72" and "2.34". 
k-Anonymity does not enforce diversity on the sensitive 
information of equivalence classes (set of tuples with the 
same identifying attributes in k-anonymous dataset). This 
has lead to extended privacy definitions [6], [13]. However 
if all sensitive attributes in the private table are unique, k- 
anonymity ensures that linkage will only be possible to groups 
of k-distinct sensitive values. 
To achieve k-anonymity in single-table datasets, numer- 
ous generalization (replacing data values with more general 
values) and suppression algorithms have been proposed [I 71, 
[7], [a], [lo], [4], [ l l ] ,  [3], [5], [15]. These algorithms 
assume each private entity is stored as one row in a single 
attribute-value table. When information about a private entity 
is contained in multiple tables, and not easily represented 
in a single table, the existing definitions and algorithms are 
insufficient. In Section 11, this paper extends the k-anonymity 
definitions to a multi-Relational setting; Section 111 discusses 
why multiR anonymity (multirelational k-anonymity) is a 
new problem that is not solved by previous k-anonymity 
algorithms. 
Single dimensional k-anonymity algorithms were designed 
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of values) for data values in the dataset to optimize against a 
certain metric. Some of such algorithms used pruning methods 
to reduce the size of the search space for optimal k-anonymity 
[lo], [4]. However in a multiR anonymity setting, the search 
space is much bigger and simple modifications won't be 
as efficient unless the original optimality is sacrificed by 
using other assumptions. In [15], [ l l] ,  [5 ] ,  it was shown 
that although not optimal, a multidimensional approach to 
k-anonymity can offer more flexibility in anonymizations. 
Among this family of algorithms, the clustering based ap- 
proach is more suitable to the multiR setting due to the 
ease in explicit identification of the entity being protected 
(anonymized) in the dataset. In Section IV, protected entities 
and associated relations will be abstracted by trees and a mod- 
ification of a previously proposed clustering algorithm will be 
presented to provide multiR anonymity on snowflake schemas. 
Section V will present experimental results evaluating the new 
approach in terms of precision and execution time. 
11. MultiR Anonymity 
We now define notations and k-anonymity for the multiR 
setting. Given a table T,  T[c][r] refers to the value of column 
c, row r of T .  T[c] is the projection of column c 
Definition I (Person specific table): A table P T  is said to 
be person specific w.r.t. some population U if and only if it 
contains a primary key attribute (or set of attributes) vzp such 
that each value of vip uniquely corresponds to an individual 
in U. 
Definition 2 (MultiR schema): A set of tables S U  and a 
set of functional dependencies SF corresponds to a multiR 
schema if S U  is a dependency preserving, lossless join 
decomposition w.r.t. SF and there exists one person specific 
table P T  E S U  where each row corresponds to an individual 
in population U. We say a database with such a schema 
has the transcript MR(SF,  U, P T ,  ST ,  vip), where vzp is the 
unique identifier in P T  and S T  = SU - {PT). 
Table I1 shows an example for a multiR database with 
transcript MR(SF ,  U, T,, {TI, Tz), Sid) where SF={Sid -, 
GPA, SCid + {Sid, Course, Grade) ) and U is the set of 
students. The schema is in BCNF and dependency preserving. 
The following quasi-identifier definition is a reformulation 
of the definition in [18]. 
Definition 3 (Quasi-identifier): Let 
MR(SF,  U, P T ,  {TI, .  . . , T,), vzp) be a multiR database, 
and J T  = P T  w Tl w . . . w T,. Let fc : U -, J T  and 
fg : J T  --t U', where U U'. A quasi-identifier of MR,  
written QMR, is a subset of attributes of J T  where 3pi E U 
such that fg(fc(pi)[QMR]) = pi, and an adversary knows 
the values of QMR for pi. 
Informally a quasi-identifier for a schema is the set of 
attributes in JT that can be used to externally link or identify a 
given tuple in P T .  In Table 11, Course and Book attributes can 
be considered quasi-identifiers since colleagues of a student 
may know this information about their friend. The attributes 
2 
TABLE IV. Notations for a given database M R i  
table 
vipZ private entity attribute in M R Z  
the person specific table of M R Z  
z L (vipZ is the primary key) 
the set of all tables in M R 2  
excluding PTi 
SUz  the set of all tables in M R Z  
JTZ join of all tables in M R Z  
Q M R i  set of quasi identifier attributes 
Snn Ri set of sensitive attributes 
GPA, Grade, Price are the sensitive attributes of the private 
entity Sid. An attacker knows the quasi-identifiers about an 
entity and tries to discover other (sensitive) information in 
the data. E.g., in Table 11, we assume the attacker knows 
that some individual George in U takes the courses 'History' 
and 'Religion' and uses the text book 'American History' for 
the 'History' course. The attacker wants to discover George's 
(sensitive) GPA or his grade in the 'History' course. If the data 
is released as it is, even though George's name is hidden, the 
attacker can easily link George to student S4 and GPA '4.00' 
or SCid SClO and grade '98'. We also have other join keys 
in Table I1 like the vip attribute Sid or SCid that are not part 
of the quasi-identifier set. 
For the rest of the paper, we will use the notation given 
in Table IV. From now on, if not mentioned otherwise, 
we will use superscripts to name different multiR databases 
(e.g., MR1, MR2,  . . . ). Superscript for other notations will 
show membership to the associated multiR database (e.g., 
vipl is vip of MR1.). We will use superscript * for multiR 
anonymizations. Subscripts will distinguish different elements 
of the same multiR database (e.g., T:, T: E  ST^ of M R ~ ) .  
Definition 4 (Structurally Equivalent): Two databases 
M R ~  and MR2 have structurally equivalent schemas if and 
only if vipl = vip2, PT' has the same set of attributes as 
PT', and there exist bijective mapping between the set of 
tables  ST^ and  ST^ such that tables mapped have the same 
set of attributes. Structurally equivalent schemas have the 
same functional dependencies, population, QI, sensitive and 
non-QI joining attribute sets. 
The MultiR databases given in Tables I1 and 111 are an 
example of structural equivalence. 
Definition 5 (k-anonymity for multiR databases): Let 
M R  and M R *  be two multiR databases with the same set of 
QI QMR and set of sensitive attributes SMR We say MR* 
is a k-anonymization of M R  if and only if Vv(JT*), (views 
on JT*)  the following properties hold: 
I) anonymized: any query of the type II,tt(v(JT*)) where 
att E SMR returns either zero tuples or at least k (not 
necessarily distinct)' tuples, 
'k-anonymity allows sensitive attribute values to be the same over the 
set of tuples with the same QI attributes. Other approaches like &diversity 
and t-closeness enforce constraints over the distribution of such groups 
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TABLE I. An example public table (university registration database), private table (university alumni 







27 Lafayette 3.12 
25 M W. Lafayette 4.00 
Anonymized Dataset 
10-20 Indiana 
20-30 G. Lafayette 3.12 
20-30 * G .  Lafayette 4.00 
TABLE II. T,:Student has GPA; Tl:Student takes courses; T2:Books bought by student for course 
table 
1 Sid 1 GPA 1 lSCidlSidl CourselGadi SCid l Book I Price / S1 1 3.72 1 I SCI I S1 I Math 1 93 1 w
TP Tl 7'2 
TABLE Ill. One anonymization of Table II where k = 2 
table 
2) anonymized w.r.t. individuals: any query of the type 
nvip(v(JT*)) returns either zero tuples or at least k 
distinct tuples, and 
3) correct: tuples in JT and JT* can be ordered such that 
for all possible j, JT* [att:l(j] is equal to or some gener- 
alization of JT[att]b] if att E QMn and JT*[att]b] is 
equal to JT[att] [j] if att E SMn 
The part 'k not necessarily distinct tuples' in requirement 1 
can be changed to 'k distinct tuples' if we assume all sensitive 
information in the M R  is unique. M R  and the k-anonymous 
MR* need not be structurally equivalent, however, we will 
see that equivalence eases the anonymization process and can 
improve utility of the dataset. 
The example in Table I1 is clearly not 
k-anonymous even for k = 2, as Insid 
(~~ourse='Histor~f~~ook='~m.Hist'(JT))I = I{S4}I = 1. 
Table 111 shows a 2-anonymization of Table I1 using 
generalizations from the domain generalization hierarchies 
given in Figure 1; the same query on Table 111 returns no 
tuples. 
Theorem I: Let M R  be a k-anonymous multiR database 
where ST = {TI, . . . , T,} and k 2 2. Then for every vip 
value v p ,  there exist some e 2 k-1 distinct vip values vpl, . . . 
I. l li t l ( i r it r i tr ti t ), ri t t l ( i r it l i
t ) ization f t ri t t l r
ta le
lic t set
Name Age Sex City
Chris 19 M Indianapolis
18 M tte
a e 27 F f tte
George 25 M W. Lafayette
riv te t set
Age Sex City GPA
19 M Indianapolis 3.72
18 M f tt .
F f tt .
. tt .
ized t s t
Age Sex City GPA
10-20 M Indiana 3.72
- M I i 2.34
- * . f tt .
- . tt .
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anonymization for PT in terms of classical k-anonymity 
Science G? 
Fig. 1. Course, Book DGH structures 
figure 
upe such that for every view u possible if up E l Iuip(u(JT))  
then upl, up',. . . upe E l Ivip(u(JT)) .  We say the set Sup = 
{up, upl, up2, . . . upe) is the equivalence class of up and write 
E C M R ( ~ P )  = Sup. 
PROOF. Suppose this is not the case and let the set of 
views Vup = {uilup E l Ivip(ui(JT)) .  Since there are no 
common k - 1 vip values (other than up) over all views 
then we have I RuiP(ui(JT))I < k. Constructing 
the view un = nu,Ev,,ui gives IlIVip(un(~T))I 5 k and 
up E r I u i p ( u n ( ~ ~ ) ) ,  violating the k-anonymity constraint. 
This gives a contradiction. 
The MR database in Table 111, has two equivalence classes: 
{S1,S2) and {S3,S4). (e.g., ECMR(S1) = { S l ,  52 ) )  
Theorem 1 can be modified for only sensitive attributes if 
we have unique sensitive values. Every sensitive value s in 
the data belongs to a set ECMR(s)  of at least k sensitive 
values such that if s  is in a query result then every element 
in ECMR(s)  is also in that query result. (e.g., in Table IU, 
E C ~ ~ ( 3 . 7 2 )  = {3.72,2.34)) 
The k-anonymity definition for a multiR database is not 
arbitrary. If an attacker faces the same set of private en- 
tities in every possible set of queries, it can only map 
its external knowledge to that set. Requirement 3 for k- 
anonymity prevents false information being included in the 
anonymization of the original database. (Otherwise there 
would be trivial solutions for k-anonymization such as repli- 
cation of tuples. This requirement holds also for classi- 
cal, single-table k-anonymity, although it was not included 
explicitly in its definition.) Note that the definitions and 
concepts given here subsume the definitions of single-table k- 
anonymity. In classical k-anonymity, we have one private table 
PT(A1 , .  . . , A,) without any dependencies corresponding to 
a population U .  Since every tuple in PT belongs to an 
individual, we can add a unique identifier attribute to PT to 
form PTp (A,, Al , . . . , A,). PTp becomes a person specific 
table with vip attribute A,. In that case an anonymization 
for MR({Au + { A l , .  . . , A,)), U, PTp, {), A,) is also an 
definitions. 
We now define two operators that will be used in the 
following sections for multiR databases: 
Definition 6 (Union): For structurally equivalent MR1, 
MR' and MRU, MRU + MR1 u MR' if and only if PTU = 
P T ~  u P T ~ ,  (T? E  ST^) = (T; E  ST^) u (T; E ST'). 
Definition 7 (Concatenation): M R I I  + M R ~ I I  MR' if and 
only if PTll = P T ~ ,  = ST~U{PT' )UST' ,  and uipll = 
uipl 
Many different cost metrics were used in the literature [8], 
[4], [15], [9] to measure utility of anonymized datasets. We 
redefine two of these cost metrics, LM[8] and DM[4], for the 
multiR setting, and use them in our experiments. Different 
variations that may better fit to relational databases can be 
formalized. (Discussion on such a formulation is beyond the 
scope of this paper.) Algorithms in the coming sections are 
independent of the cost metric being used and discussions 
apply no matter what cost metric is being used. 
Definition 8 (LM): f (u)  be a function that given a cat- 
egorical [continuous] data cell value u returns the number 
of distinct values [value interval +1] that cell value stands 
for, and g(att) be a function that returns the number of 
distinct values [value range +1] in from the domain of a given 
categorical [continuous] attribute att. Assuming g(att) > 1, 
the general loss metric for a multiR database MR* 
- 
T E S U *  
LM metric can be defined on individual data cells. It 
penalizes the value of each data cell in the anonymized dataset 
depending on how general it is (how many leaves are below 
it on the DGH tree). (e.g., LM("ScienceW) = ~ ' ( ~ ~ ~ ~ : : , ' ~ : =  
g) LM for the multiR dataset normalizes the total cost to 
get a number between 0 and 1. 
Definition 9 (DM): Let MR* be an anonymization of M R  
and let GMR* (up) be the set of vips in MR* indistinguishable 
from a given vip up E MR. Then 
DM(MR*)  = 1 (GMR- (up11 
vpEMR 
As in the LM metric, smaller the number returned by DM 
metric, better the anonymization. 
111. Single Table Algorithms for MultiR 
Anonymity 
We now explore some obvious approaches to achieving 
multiR anonymity using single table k-anonymity algorithms. 
The main idea is to convert the multiR database into one or 
more single tables and anonymize these. For each approach, 
we describe why it does not give satisfactory results; the 
.
v £ v v I vip(v(JT))
VPI, VP2,'" v £ I ip(v(JT)). vp
vp, VPI, VP , . v d v
MR(VP) v .
OOF.
vp v v I ip(Vi(JT)).
v )
nv,EVvp IIvip(Vi(JT))1 .











u , I '" n).
u.
u --> I,'" n}}, , , }, u )
ion): I,
R2 u , u ¢= I U R2 u
TI U T2, jU STU l S I U J 2).
tenation): RII ¢= I II R2










i s] tt) I,
L L £ f(T[qi][j]) - 1
*' '_ g(qi) - 1
LM(MR*) = TESU qlEQITJ-I
L ITI·IQIrI
SU*











TABLE V. The universal table for T, and T1 along with 2 anonymizations of it where k = 2 
table 
TABLE VI. Local anonymizations for T, and TI where k = 2 
table 
I Sid I Course Grade 
SI I Scicncc 1 93 
I I / SI I Science 1 91 1 1 I I I S1 I Physics / 
mi 
{S2,S4) Religion I I S3 I History I 
s 3  i social i 75 1 mi fS2.S3) I Phvsics 77 I 
TABLE VII. Bitmap version of M R  without some of the sensitive attributes and its 2-anonymization, 
attribute T in each course shows whether the student has taken that course or not. This reduces the 
info loss in the anonymization to some degree 
table 
r l p l i ti
Sid Course GPA




















































































i i ati ,
i ation
Sid Math Physics CS History Religion GPA
T Di T Ca Dyn T Di T RH Ot AH T Yo
SI 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 I 1 0 0 0 0 3.72
S2 0 0 1 0 I 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2.34
S3 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 3.12
S4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4.00
SI * * 1 * 1 * * * * 0 0 * * 3.72 I
S2 * * 1 * 1 * * * * 0 0 * * 2.34 I,
S3 0 0 * * 0 0 0 1 0 * * 1 * 3.12 I
S4 0 0 * * 0 0 0 1 0 * * 1 * 4.00 I
insights are useful in understanding the algorithm we will 
give in Section IV. 
A. Universal Anonymization 
One solution might be to construct the universal relation 
from the multiR database and run a single-table anonymiza- 
tion algorithm on this relation. Table J T  in Table V shows the 
universal table for the database MR(SF, U, Tp, {TI), Sid). 
(the attribute SCid is removed but this does not affect the 
discussion.) To run an anonymity algorithm, we need to 
identify the attributes that need to be modified. We have two 
choices at this point. The first approach is to modify only the 
quasi-identifier attributes (attribute Course in J T )  leaving the 
others untouched. Dataset ATl in Table V is one possible 2- 
anonymization of J T .  However, we see that ATl obviously 
does not provide anonymity when an attacker knows all or 
some of the courses taken by a student. E.g., if an attacker 
knows that Chris is taking History, Math and Physics, then 
it will map Chris to S1 since S1 is the only one taking two 
science courses and a history course. 
A second approach would be to modify join keys (NDGH 
generalizations [15]) along with the quasi-identifiers (e.g., 
attributes Course and Sid in JT) .  Dataset AT2 in Table V is 
such a 2-anonymization of J T ,  but still fails to satisfy privacy 
constraints. 
The main reason anonymization of a universal relation 
fails is that multiple tuples belong to a single person and 
the anonymization process does not take this into account. It 
becomes possible that tuples belonging to the same entity 
are anonymized with each other, making the relation "k- 
anonymous" but failing to protect individual identity. One 
way of resolving this would be to suppress all the data in 
the joining attributes (e.g., Sid). But in that case, the dataset 
would lose its relational structure and the valuable information 
in the I-N or N-N relations (e.g., the information that a 
student taking Math, Physics and History has GPA 3.72 would 
be lost). This universal approach also suffers from inference 
channels due to the redundancy in representation when the 
adversary knows functional dependencies for the schema, e.g., 
in AT2, given Sid + G P A  holds, the attacker will discover 
the third tuple is actually Sid S1 since the first two tuples 
imply the student with GPA 2.71 is S1. A related work 
[21] worth mentioning here was on checking k-anonymity on 
views over a universal dataset. The work was not based on 
table generalizations and did not propose a k-anonymization 
algorithm to create anonymous views. 
B. Local Anonymization 
Another way to anonymize the dataset would be to k- 
anonymize each table independently. The most basic way of 
doing that is shown in T; and T: of Table VI. This set of 
tables suffers from the same problems mentioned in Section 
111-A (e.g., disclosure of Chris's GPA.) 
6 
A second approach again would be to use NDGH general- 
izations on non-QI join keys as shown in T; and T?. In this 
case, for this particular MR database, GPA information seems 
to be 2-anonymous. However, sensitive Grade information 
is not protected. The attacker will still be able to map S1 
to Chris and learn that he has received "93" and "91" in 
two science courses (although not which course each score 
belongs to.) This is a violation of anonymity requirement 2, 
since Chris is not anonymous with respect to another student. 
Another downside of the approach is that modifying join keys 
introduces many incorrect join paths, decreasing the usability 
of the data. 
The main reason why local anonymizations fail is that 
use of independent and arbitrary mappings for generalization 
of one table can create inference channels with respect to 
mappings used by other tables. A multiR anonymity algorithm 
should use consistent mappings throughout datasets (e.g., by 
Theorem 1; if S1 and S2 are anonymized with each other 
in one table, their courses should also be anonymized with 
each other in the other table.) Tables T; and T? show 
a valid 2-anonymization that enforces consistent mapping. 
Anonymization should also decide which mapping to use for 
anonymization. Clearly a multiR anonymity algorithm needs 
to view data globally to come up with close mappings between 
private entities while maintaining precision and usefulness of 
the output data. The multiR anonymity algorithm given in 
Section IV will take all these observations into account and 
give global decisions for anonymization mappings. 
C. Bitmap Anonymization 
Some multiR databases can be converted to a boolean 
vector "bitmap" format with every private entity as a single 
row, and distinct attributes used to reflect different values. 
Bitmap conversion is done by assigning the value "1" 
for attributes that the private entity possess in the MR 
database. Handling the other attributes that the entity does 
not possess is done differently for different types of MR 
databases. In complete databases, non-existing tuples in the 
db (negative tuples) implies that the individual does not 
possess the corresponding attribute. Thus non-existent tuples 
also constitute in the information content of the database. 
(e.g., University Registration Database, Voters Database, . . . 
In Tl of Table 11, S I  taking "Religion" course is missing 
implying Chris definitely did not take the "Religion" course.) 
In bitmap versions of complete databases, "0" is used for 
non-existent attributes of the entities. On the other hand, 
in incomplete databases, negative tuples imply uncertainty 
and they do not add into the information content. (e.g., 
hospital databases, business databases that share customers, 
. .  . Having a patient not having a particular disease in a 
hospital database does not necessarily imply that patient did 
not have the disease. It is always possible that full records 
of a patient are contained in multiple hospitals.) In bitmap 
versions of incomplete databases, value "*" is used for non- 
l i ti
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existent attributes of the entities to express uncertainty. 
Table VII shows the bitmap version of the complete MR 
database given in Table I1 and its 2-anonymization. Classical 
k-anonymity algorithms can be run on such datasets. The 
anonymized data will then satisfy both multiR anonymity 
requirements for certain types of relations, however: 
1) Not every multiR database is bitmap convertible. 
Schemas containing tables that map one entity to another 
entity an arbitrary number of times cannot be converted 
to bitmap format without information loss. (E.g., a 
student taking n different Physic classes where n is 
arbitrarily large cannot be readily expressed. This is a 
serious drawback for datasets that are updated frequently. 
Updates on certain individuals can trigger changes in the 
schema of the anonymized dataset.) 
2) For incomplete databases, anonymization would only 
be through suppression, as generalizing "S1 is taking 
a Math course and S2 is taking a CS course" into 
"S1 and S2 are both taking a Science course" would 
correspond to merging columns in the schema rather than 
generalization of data. So anonymizations cannot take 
advantage of user supplied generalization hierarchies or 
total ordering assumptions for the attribute domains (for 
the sake of both utilization and incorporating domain 
knowledge). 
3) For complete databases, anonymizations would addi- 
tionally preserve common negative information (e.g., 
"S3 is not taking a CS course and S4 is not taking 
a CS course", anonymization would preserve "neither 
S3 nor S4 is taking a CS course") However it is still 
impossible to incorporate domain knowledge through 
generalization hierarchies or total ordering assumptions. 
(e.g., generalizing a student taking "CS" with another 
student taking "Math" is as costly as generalizing two 
students taking "CS' and "Religion" respectively, even 
though the former could be a better generalization.) 
Suppression in the bitmap setting removes certainty 
about the number of tuples corresponding to a given 
entity. (e.g., "SI is taking a Math course and S2 is taking 
a CS course" could safely be generalized into "S1 and S2 
are both taking at least one ("Science") course". Bitmap 
anonymization would imply "Sl and S2 are taking two 
courses in total".) 
Bitmap anonymizations do not consider possible similar- 
ities of two private entities in the tail of a nested relation. 
(E.g., in the multiR database in Table 11, S1 is taking a 
points are skewed over the whole possible space, thig 
does not introduce further problems regarding the curse 
of dimensionality. However, k-anonymity algorithms do 
not take into account the existence of 'invalid points' 
(e.g., a point with Math-T:O, Math-Di:l would be an 
invalid point implying student has not taken 'Math' 
but used the 'Discrete' book for the 'Math' course. 
Heuristics would need to be used that would ignore 
invalid points to speed up the anonymization. 
7) Most real world data is stored as relational tables rather 
than bitmap tables. Conversion to such a bitmap costs 
additional execution time and storage, not to mention the 
cost of converting applications designed for the original 
schema. 
8) Many real world relational databases contain correlations 
within relations and this may make certain heuristics 
for improving efficiency possible. (e.g., a student taking 
a 'science' course is more likely to buy a 'science' 
or 'math' book than a 'religion' book. It is possible 
to design fast and reasonably precise algorithms that 
decide anonymizations only on courses without consid- 
ering book information.) It may be difficult to exploit 
such correlations without considering the structure of the 
data. A single table k-anonymity algorithm on a bitmap 
database will be unaware of the underlying structure and 
thus the correlation. 
IV. Clustering-based MultiR Anonymity 
We now develop a multiR anonymity algorithm that over- 
comes the shortcomings of the approaches described in the 
previous section, although it places certain (reasonable) re- 
strictions on the schemas supported. Algorithms for arbitrary 
schemas are left as future work. 
A. Assumptions and Properties 
We aim to preserve certain properties of the database, and 
in doing so accept certain limitations on the databases that 
can be anonymized by our algorithm. These properties and 
assumptions are given here. 
Schema Preservation: The schemas of the input database 
M R  and the k-anonymous output MR* will be structurally 
equivalent (Definition 4). 
Dependency Preservation: The anonymized database pre- 
serves functional dependencies of the original database, so 
that: 
Math course, buys the Discrete book for the course and 1) the semantics of the data are better preserved, and S2 is taking a CS course and buvs the same book. Given 
" 
that course information is generalized (or suppressed), 2) inference attacks, by an adversary who knows a func- 
the book information can safely be preserved without vi- tional dependency that fails to hold in the anonymized 
olating privacy. Bitmap anonymization would not retain data, are prevented. 
only the book information.) We require that the schema be normalized to enforce de- 
6) Conversion to bitmap format produces datasets of high pendencies; this obviates the need to provide dependencies 
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Snowflake Schema: The algorithm we present is limited 
to schemas satisfying the following constraints: 
1) No connection keys (primarylforeign keys) between ta- 
bles in MR are quasi-identifiers. (It is possible to replace 
such quasi-identifiers with non-identifying keys to pre- 
serve connections.) 
2) Every table in S T  contains only one foreign key. Table 
P T  does not contain a foreign key. 
3) We say a table T2 belongs to the family of Tl and write 
T2 E F(Tl) if T2 has a foreign key attribute which is a 
primary key attribute either in Tl or in another family 
member of TI. We restrict ourselves to schemas with 
F(PT)  = ST. 
Schemas with these constraints are similar to snowflake 
relations where the fact table is the table P T  (see Figure 2), 
although we do support one to many relationships between 
PT and other tables. Any table in the schema can contain 
sensitive attributes; anonymity constraint 1 will hold for all of 
them. This family of schemas is expressive enough for many 
database applications (XML, some spatio-temporal databases, 
data warehouses, ...) 
Join Key Atomicity: The algorithm presented in the 
next section will preserve the atomicity of join keys. (The 
assumption that join keys are not quasi-identifiers makes it 
possible to follow this approach in all cases.) This ensures one 
true join path as opposed to multiple paths (as in {T~,T?)  
of Table VI) in each connection and improves utility of the 
anonymization (a query on the anonymized dataset is "true", 
in the sense that the result is a generalization of the result on 
the underlying dataset.) 
B. MultIRelAtional CLustEring ( ~ i ~ a ~ l e j  
Anonymization Algorithm 
We now present a MiRaCle anonymization algorithm that 
anonymizes a given multiR database under the assumptions 
given in the previous section. We first give a higher level 
description of the algorithm to make the formal explanation 
easy to follow. 
I )  Informal Description: MiRaCle is a clustering-based 
anonymity algorithm; any distance-based clustering k- 
anonymity algorithm [5], [IS], [ l ]  can be used as a basic 
skeleton for MiRaCle anonymizations. The main observation 
is that all clustering based anonymity algorithms make use of 
two basic operations on private entities: anonymization and 
calculation of the distance between two entities. The latter 
can be generally defined as the cost of the anonymization 
of two entities. As an example basic skeleton, in the next 
section, we present a trivial modification of CDGH clustering 
algorithm [15] for MiRaCle. Here we turn our attention to the 
real question: How to anonymize two entities? 
The assumptions given in the previous section enables us 
to abstract entities of a multiR databases as trees where each 
level of a given entity tree corresponds to levels of the nested 
relation for a particular vip entity. (Figure 3 gives an example.) 
The challenge is to anonymize two trees of similar structure 
with respect to each other. 
Algorithm 1 anonymize(tree(sl), tree(s2)) 
Require: For a tree node s; tree(s) returns the tree rooted 
from s and us returns the QI attribute values associated 
with node s. For two values of the same domain vl and 
212, gen(vl, v2) returns the lowest cost generalization of 
vl and vz w.r.t. a dgh. 
I: VC, , vc2 = gen(vcl, vc2) 
2: let C1 be the set of child nodes of node s l  
3: let C2 be the set of child nodes of node s2 
4: find a low cost pairing of nodes in C1 and C2 
5: for all matching pairs of nodes (cl E Cl, c2 E C2) do 
6: anonymize(tree (cl ), tree(c2)) 
7: for all nodes c E (C1 u C2) unmatched do 
8: suppress every value in nodes of tree(c) 
Algorithm 1 shows how to anonymize two entity trees. 
Anonymization occurs top-down. First QI attributes for tree 
roots are anonymized with each other. Each tree root has 
a set of child nodes. (In Figure 3, children of S1 and S2: 
Cl={"Math", "Physics", "History"), C2={"CS", "Physics", 
"Religion").) The algorithm chooses pairings of nodes be- 
tween these sets to minimize the local cost in the current 
level or the overall cost of the anonymized trees. (In Figure 
3, "Math" is paired with "CS", "Physics" with "Physics", 
and "History" with "Religion", producing the set of nodes 
{"Science", "Physics", "Social") which is the least costly set 
in terms of the cost metric used (e.g., LM.) Since each pair 
is composed of two trees to be anonymized and function is 
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Fig. 3. Anonymization of students S1 and S2 
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called on the subtrees. (In Figure 3, a second call is made 
on (tree("Math"), tree("CSn)). "Math" and "CS" values are 
changed to "Science" as a result of the second call . Unpaired 
nodes are suppressed (e.g., node "Calc.") 
2) Formal Description: We first show in Algorithm 2 how 
to modify the CDGH clustering algorithm [15] to anonymize 
a given multiR database. Each cluster has a representative 
that holds the anonymization of the entities it contains. For 
each vip value v, the algorithm finds, in line 5, a suitable 
cluster to put v into. Suitability is measured by a distance 
function dist which we will define shortly. If there is no 
suitable cluster, in line 7. v defines a new one. Then in line 
9, the cluster representative of the closest cluster is updated 
to be the anonymization of v and the former representative 
by calling the function anon. When a cluster is full, the 
identifying information in the tuples in the cluster (including 
tuples linked to in other tables) is replaced with the cluster 
representative; these generalized tuples are placed into the 
anonymized database and the cluster is deleted. In lines 13- 
20, leftover clusters are combined. Leftover tuples in the last 
cluster (< k) are suppressed. 
As also mentioned in the previous section, the real chal- 
lenge is to define the distance between the two points (e.g., 
private entities such as students). If we know how to produce 
anonymizations of two points with respect to each other, 
we can derive the distance between them by calculating the 
cost of their anonymization w.r.t. any precision/cost metric. 
Here are formal details regarding how MiRaCle defines the 
anonymization and distance functions between two private 
entities (vips) vl E MR' and v2 E MR': 
Algorithm 2 MiRaCle(MR, k, th,  climit, anon, dist, cost) '' 
Require: An input database MR with S T  = {TI, .  . . , T,), k 
constraint, a threshold value th, a cluster limit climit; 
an anonymization function anon that can anonymize two 
private entities; 
a distance function dist that can calculate the distance of 
two private entities; 
a cost metric function cost defined over anonymized MR 
databases; 
We begin with an empty set of clusters C.  vip v,, is the 
cluster representative of cluster ci, MR,, is the database 
that contains v,, and EC,, holds the set of private entities 
in c, . 
Ensure: MR* is a k-anonymization of MR 
I: MR* +- null 
2: for all vip value vj in PT do 
3: if C is empty then 
4: go to line 7 
5: find i s.t. di = dist(vj, v,, , MR, MR,, ) is minimum 
6: if (4 > th) A ( ( C (  5 climit) then 
7: make a new cluster cn,,, set cluster representative 
8: go to step 2 to process the next vip in MR 
9: MR,, = anon(v,,, vj, MRc,, MR). 
10: ECc ,=ECc ,U{v j )  
11: if the number of elements in c" becomes more than k 
then 
12: MR* = MR* U MR,,; C = C - c, (remove Q) 
13: for all cluster c+ left in C do 
14: find j # i s.t. d, = dist(v,., v,,, MRcj, MR,,) is min. 
15: MR,, = anon(vc,, v,, , MA,, , MR,, ). 
16: EC,, = EC,, U EC,, ; C = C - c, (remove cj) 
17: if the number of elements in c, becomes more than k 
then 
18: C = C - c+ (remove G);  MR' = MR* U MR,, 
19: else 
20: go to line 14 to find another suitable j. 
21: MR* now contains only one vip vi data for each equivalence 
class, add the anonymizations for other vips by using EC,, 
sets created in the process. 
22: suppress the remaining vips in C and add to MR* 
23: return MR* 
For each entity in the input M R  db, MiRaCle makes 
one call to function Anonymize per cluster representative. 
Since the number of cluster representative is bounded by the 
input parameter climit, MiRaCle calls Anonymize O(c1imit. 
I M R ( )  times. The efficiency of the algorithm depends on the 
efficiency of the Anonymize function. 
Function " ~ n o n ~ m i z e ( t ' , t ~ ,  M R ~ ,  M R ~ ) "  produces an 
anonymization for two tuples t1 E P T ~  and t2 E pT2 .  (ti 
anon(Vl,V2,MR\MR2) =
Anonymize(O"vipl=Vl PT1 , O"Vi p2=V2 PT2 , MR 1 , MR 2)
dist(Vl,V2,MR\MR2) =
cost( anon(vl, V2, MR1 , MR2))
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Algorithm 3 ~nonvmizef t l ,  t2. MR', MR2) 
Require: Tuple t i  belongs to table pT i .  All M R ~  are struc- 
turally equivalent, Function gen(v1, v2) returns the common 
parent of values vl, v2 on the dgh structure of the associated 
domain. 
Ensure: MR* is an anonymization of t1 and t2  
I: T* e NULL 
2: Let MR* be a database with transcript (., ., T*, {), vipl) 
3: for all att, of PT1  do 
4: if atti is a QI attribute then {Just anonymize) 
5: T'[atti:l[l] e gen(tl [att,], t2[atti]) 
6: if atti is a non-QI non-key or a foreign key then {Copy) 
7: T *  [attil[l] e t1 [atti]; 
8: if atti  is a primary key for a join with another table then 
{Ensure anonymized across join) 
9: for all pairs of tables T i ,  Tk2 in MR', MR' where atti 
is a foreign key do 
10: Let MR3, be the database with transcript 
{., ., T i ,  F (T~) ,  a t t i )  
11: MR* e MR*lI AnonymizeSets ( u a t t i = t ~ ( a t t i l ~ i .  
~ ~ t t ~ = t z [ ~ t t ~ ~ T k Z ~  MRk, MR:) 
12: T*[attil[ll e tl[atti] 
13: return MR' - 
Algorithm 4 ~ n o n ~ r n i z e ~ e t s ( C '  = {ti ,  t i , .  . . t k ) ,  C2  = 
{t:',t;, . . .t;), MR', M R ~ )  
Require: Sets of tuples Ci  belongs to tables PT'. All M R ~  are 
structurally equivalent. 1 < m 5 n 
Ensure: MR* is a painvise anonymization of C1 and C2  
1: Let MR* be an empty database, structurally eq. to MRZ. 
2: for al l  t i  E C1 do 
3: for al l  t: E C 2  do 
4: tempMRj e Anonymize(t:, t:, MR1, MR2) 
5: costMRj e cost(tempMRj) 
6: minCost j  e arg min . w s t M R j  
7: MR* e MR* U t e m p ~ ~ m i n c o s t j  
8: C 2  -+ C2 - tmincostj 
9: Suppress rest of the tuples in C2 and add them to P T *  
10: return MR* 
may be considered as a root node of a tree structure stored 
in database M R ~ ,  e.g., Figure 3) The function classifies and 
processes each attribute one by one. Processing of primary 
key attributes is important since they serve as connections 
to other tables. Attribute evaluation can be summarized as 
follows: 
Lines 4-7: for non-key attributes and foreign key at- 
tributes, behave as in single table anonymity: anonymize 
QI attributes w.r.t. dgh structures, leave the rest (sensitive 
attributes and foreign keys) as they are. 
Lines 8-12: for a primary key attribute att, find all pairs 
of tables (Ti E ST~,T; E ST') where att  is a foreign 
key. We will have two sets of tuples C1 = {t i , .  . . , tk)  
and C 2  = {t:, . . . , t&)  in T i  and T: respectively where 
each t t[att]  = t l[att]  and each t:[att] = t2[att]. Call 
"anonymize~ets(C1, C2,  ., ., .))' to find suitable one-to- 
one matchings between tf s and t is .  Suitability of a given 
10 
matching depends on the effect of the generalization 
on all of the connected tables (This is ensured by 
recursive calls to the anonymization function in Line 4.) 
Anonymize matched tuples with each other, suppressing 
any unmatched tuples. 
Given sets of tuples C' and C2, and assuming n = Ic' 1 = 
IC21 there are O(n!) possible pairwise matchings. It is costly 
to search such a big space to find a cost optimal matching. 
Because of this, algorithm anonymizesets uses the following 
matching heuristic. Each node in C1 is matched optimally 
with a node in C 2  one by one. (e.g., t i  is matched with a 
tuple in C2,  then t i  is matched with another, . . . )  This way 
complexity reduces to 0 (n2)  painvise matchings. 
The algorithm can use any incremental cost metric that can 
be defined on a database. For the experiments, we will use 
the LM metric defined in Section 11. 
Table 111 shows the output of MiRaCle on the MR input 
given in Table I1 for k = 2. vip S1 and S2, and vip S3 
and S4 anonymized with each other. Figure 3 shows how 
S1 and S2 are anonymized. The algorithm first ensures the 
tuples are anonymous w.r.t. QI attributes. Since Tp does not 
contain any QI attributes, no change is done (the root nodes 
in Figure 3). However, the primary key of Tp, Sid, occurs in 
Tl  as a foreign key, so algorithm AnonymizeSets is called on 
the sets of tuples us id=~~sl~/Ti  and u ~ ~ ~ = ~ ~ ~ ~ , , T I  (the nodes 
on the second level of the trees). A one-to-one matching of 
tuples is done according to how costly the anonymization 
of the matched tuples will be. Anonymization in this level 
also takes into account table T2 (Books table), since T2 and 
Tl share SCid  as a joining key. First, the "Math" node is 
matched with the "CS" node since they can be anonymized 
as "Science" and they have a common node in the third level 
(in table Tz). The "Physics" node is matched with "Physics", 
the anonymization here triggers a call of AnonymizeSets on 
the sets of nodes {"Calc", "Dyn") and {"Dyn"). Node "Dyn" 
is matched with node "Dyn". No match is found for the node 
"Calc" so it is suppressed. The last nodes in the second level 
. - 
are anonymized similarly. 
If we take the function gen as the basic operation, function 
anonymize (and thus the algorithm MiRaCle) turns out to 
be expensive. Assuming n = lC1l = IC21, for every call 
to anonymizesets(C1, c 2 ,  ., .), 0 ( n 2 )  generalizations are 
performed. Note that the anonymize function (thus function 
anonymizeSets) is recursively called for every level in the 
relation (roughly speaking for every table in the MR data- 
base). Given that we have [ levels (tables) in M R ,  complexity 
function is defined as f(e) = n2  . f (e - 1). This gives us a 
complexity of 0(nZe)  for function anonymize. So MiRaCle 
is an O(c1imit . lMRl . nZe) algorithm. 
C. MiRaCle Extension: MiRaCleX 
As mentioned in the previous sections, a multiR 
anonymization algorithm can make use of the relational 
structure of the database to come up with more efficient 
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heuristics. We present one example of such a heuristic in this 
section. 
The MiRaCle anonymization process given in Section IV- 
B.2 considers the whole sibling subtrees when deciding on a 
suitable matching of sibling nodes. (in other words, subtree 
matching is done rather than node matching.) This is an 
effective way of achieving an anonymization with maximum 
precision. However, it is costly in terms of execution time 
since the Anonymize function has to be called for each 
potentially matched subtree pair (even for pairs that are not 
matched at the end of the anonymization process). 
MiRaCle extension, MiRaCleX, makes use of the follow- 
ing observation: If QI values for two root nodes are similal; 
then QI values for their children are likely to be similar too. 
(If two students are both taking "Math" course, it is probable 
that they are both using a "Math" book.) This observation 
can be generalized for most relational databases. (The tail 
of the relations is correlated with the root of the relation.) 
An algorithm may produce anonymizations with reasonable 
precision much faster by just looking at the QI attribute 
similarities of the upper level nodes of the relation and not 
considering lower level nodes. Given this, pairing of sibling 
nodes in the AnonymizeSets function of MiRaCleX can be 
rewritten as in Algorithm 5. By this, the recursive call to 
the Anonymize function is moved outside of the innermost 
loop and the complexity function for function anonymize 
becomes f ( e )  = n . f (e - 1) + n2. This gives us a complexity 
of O(ne+') for function anonymize. So MiRaCleX is an 
O(climit . I M R (  . ne+') algorithm. 
In Figure 3, to find a matching be- 
tween {"~ath","~h~sics~","~istory") and 
{ " ~ ~ " , " ~ h ~ s i c s ~ " , " ~ e l i ~ i o n " )  in the second level, MiRaCleX 
Anonymize function only considers QI attributes in the Course 
table TI, ignoring information in the Books table T2. Once 
matching is done on the second level (e.g., " ~ h ~ s i c s ' "  
to "Physics2"), QI attributes in the Books table specify 
the matching on the third level (e.g., a matching between 
{"Calc","Dyn") and {"Dyn")). 
D. Proof of k-Anonymity  for MiRaCle Anonymiza -  
t i o n  A l g o r i t h m  
Now we prove that MiRaCle produces k-anonymous data- 
bases'. Since the algorithm preserves the structure of the 
data and all changes are based on either generalizations or 
suppressions, the third requirement for k-anonymity trivially 
holds. The following theorems prove the first requirement 
(sensitive information protection). The proof for the second 
requirement is similar. Since k-anonymity ensures total pro- 
tection against sensitive information disclosure only when 
sensitive information is unique for every tuple, throughout the 
proof, we assume such constraint is enforced in the dataset 
and prove sensitive information is k-anonymous in the output 
2~iscussion also applies for MiRaCleX 
Algorithm 5 ~ n o n ~ m i z e ~ e t s ~ ( ~ '  = {t i ,  t i , .  . . t k} ,  c2 
lt? , tZ. .  . . t ? ~ .  M R ~ .  M R ~ )  
Require: Sets of tuples ci belongs to tables PT~.  All M R ~  are 
structurally equivalent. 1 < m 5 n 
Ensure: MR* is a painvise anonymization of c1 and C 2  
1: let MR* be an empty database, structurally eq. to MR'. 
2: for all t: E C1 do 
3: for all t: E C 2  do 
4: for all attribute a t t  of t: do 
5: if at t  is a QI attribute then 
6:  t; [att] -+ gen(t! [att], t?[att]) 
7: else 
8: t; [att] -+ t: [att] 
9: minCost j  -+ argrninj cost(t;) 
10: tempMR -+ Anonymize(t:, tkinCostj, MR', MR2) 
11: MR* -+ MR* U tempMR 
12: c2 -+ C2 - tLinCostj 
13: suppress rest of the tuples in c2 and add them to P T *  
14: return MR* 
dataset. We assume the schemas satisfy the assumptions given 
in Section IV-A. 
We start by showing that anonymization of two private 
entities is correctly carried out by the function Anonymize. 
The function Anonymize given in Algorithm 3 produces one 
representation of the anonymization as opposed to multiple 
copies of it. For each equivalence class, copies are produced 
from the representation at the end of MiRaCle given in 
Algorithm 2. It is trivial to modify the function Anonymize to 
output the necessary copies. The proofs below will assume 
copies exist in the Anonymize output. Since the algorithm 
structure is recursive, we first prove the base case: 
Lemma 2: Let MR1 and M R ~  have structurally equiva- 
lent schemas with  ST^ = {). Let ti be a tuple in P T ~ .  
Then function " ~ n o n ~ m i z e ( t l ,  2, MR', MR2)" produces a 2- 
anonymization for the tuples t1 and t2. 
PROOF. Since there are no tables connected to P T ~ ,  
Anonymize only applies basic generalizations to QI attributes 
of ti as in the single table k-anonymization process. This 
ensures each QI in the two anonymized tuples is the same. 
Therefore any subset of the QI occurs in at least two tuples; 
with no links to other tables, 2-anonymity holds.3 
We now prove, in a bottom up fashion, the recursive step 
to prove that k-anonymity property is propagated through 
connected tables: If we take a set of k-anonymous databases, 
and add another k-anonymous table where the join keys for 
each set of private entities join (only) with an equivalence 
class in the table, and vice-versa, then the combined set of 
tables is k-anonymous. 
Lemma 3: Let MR', . . . , MRi, . . . , MRt be t structurally 
equivalent k-anonymous databases with set of sensitive at- 
tributes S, QI attributes Q = {qil,. . . , qil) and a common 
3 ~ h e  algorithm behaves exactly like CDGH anonymization algorithm 
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vip attribute vip. Suppose P T ~ S  contain a key pri. Let 
ECMRi(pri') returns the set o f  pri values that belong to 
the equivalence class of the pri value pri' in MRi. Also 
suppose for any value pri', ECMRa (pri') = ECMRb ( ~ r i ' )  if
pri' E PTa,  P T ~ .  That means equivalence classes of attribute 
pri are the same in all M R ~ .  Let ~ ~ ~ ~ ( ~ r i ' )  return this 
universal equivalence class o f  pri'. 
Let MRToot be another k-anonymous db with 
transcript (., ., T ,  {) ,pri) .  Suppose T has attributes 
(pi ,  attl ,  . . . , attm, senl, . . . , senn). By definition pri 
is the primary key, attis are QI attributes , and senjs 
are sensitive attributes. (Note that T should be also k- 
anonymous.) and also suppose ~ C ~ ( p r i ' )  = ~ C ~ ~ ( p r i ' )  
for every possible pri'. Then MR = MRToot 1 l(Ui MRi)  is 
also k-anonymous. 
As an example for Lemma 3, in Ta- 
ble 111, MR1={.,.,a~ourse=~~~ciencell~i> 
{ ~ s c ~ ~ = s c ~ v s c ~ ~ = s c ~ T ~ * ) ,  SCid), 
MR2={.,.,acourse=ll~hysicsll~;, 
{ascid=sc2vscid=scsT~}, SCid). The pri attribute 
above corresponds to the attribute Sid and MRroot = 
{., . , T ' ,  0, Sid). 
PROOF. Suppose this is not the case and there exists a 
query Q on the join JT where 0 < I&(Q(JT))I < k for 
some sensitive s which is an attribute either in S or in table 
T .  We will look at each case separately. First suppose s E S 
and some sf E &(Q(JT)) .  This implies that there exists at 
least one tuple t(pri = p, attl .., = a1 ., vip = v ,  qil...e = 
ql ...e, s = s f )  E JT (otherwise s f  has no connection with 
T and we get a contradiction from the k-anonymity o f  the 
MRi), and (pri = p, attl .., = a1 .,) E T .  Now suppose sf 
occurs in MRa (1 5 a 5 j )  and (vip = v,pri = p, s = 
s f ,  qi ,...e = ql ...e) E JTa.  Since MRa is k-anonymous, 
(vip = vj,pri = pj, s = sj,qi ,...e = ql ...e) E JTa also 
holds, for every pj E ECMR(p) and for distinct sj.  By 
the definition o f  T ,  if (pri = p,attl .., = a1 .,) E T ,  
also (pri = pj, attl ..., = a1 .,) E T holds for the same 
set o f  pjs. However, in that case (pri = pj,attl .., = 
a1 ., vip = v,qi l...e = ql ...e, s = s j )  E JT.  This means 
we have at least k - 1 other s values with the same QI 
attributes as s f .  (e.g., consider table Tp  in Figure 3, p=S1 
and one MRa is the two generalization trees with s = 
93,78 respectively and both rooted from "Science" node with 
ECTp(Sl)  = ECMRa(S1)={S1,S2). AS S1 is connected to 
one tree, S2 is connected to the other. This is true for all 
other MRas: two MR dbs rooted from "Physics" and "Social" 
nodes respectively. It is impossible to distinguish S1 from 
S2 by using only QI attributes.) Then if s f  E IIs(Q(JT)) ,  
sj E &(Q(JT) )  meaning Ins (Q(JT))I 2 k. 
The proof is similar when s is an attribute from T .  Suppose 
again sf E IIs(Q(JT))  and (pri = p, attl .., = a1 ...,, vip = 
v,qi ,...e = ql ...e, s = s f )  E JT.  In this case, p may occur 
in more than one MRa but since equivalence class o f  p is 
the same in each o f  them, discussion is still valid. In this 
1 
case, we have (pri = p,attl ..., = a1 ., s = s f )  E T and 
(vip = v,pri = p,qi l...e = q1 ...e) E JTa.  Since MRa is 
k-anonymous, (vip = vj ,pri  = pj, qil...e = ql ...e) E JTa 
also holds, for every pj E ECMR(p). By the definition o f  
T ,  (pri = pj, s = sj,att l... ,  = a1 .,) E T holds for same 
pjs and distinct sj.  Again we will have, (vip = v j , ~ i  = 
pj, attl .., = a1 ...,,q il...e = ql ...e, s = s j )  E JT and sj E 
n s ( Q ( J T ) ) .  
Theorem 4: Let MR1 and MR2 have structurally equiva- 
lent schemas with  ST^ = {T!, . . . ,T:} and tuple ti E P T ~ .  
Then function " ~ n o n ~ m i z e ( t l ,  t2 ,  MR1, MR2)" produces 2- 
anonymization for the tuples t1  and t2 in some MultiR db 
MR*. 
PROOF. Without loss of generality, suppose only T ~ S  di- 
rectly joins with P T ~ S .  In Lines 4-7, the algorithm first 
generalizes t1  and t2 with each other. This provides 2- 
anonymity for t1  and t2 locally in PT*. ( I f  we create a 
MR db for the anonymous t1 and t2 ,  it will refer to the 
2-anonymous MRroot in Lemma 3.) Next, in line 4 of  the 
anonymizeSets algorithm, the anonymization function is called 
on each pair o f  their connections in T: and T:. (Databases 
returned from these calls correspond to 2-anonymous MRa 
databases of Lemma 3.) Returned anonymous dbs are first 
merged in line 7 of  anonymizeSets and then concatenated with 
the anonymous tuples in line 1 1  as in Lemma 3. (MR* = 
M R ~ O O ~  J J  (Ui MRi ) )  Since operations are propagated through 
those tuples of T: and T: joined with t1  and t2 ,  equivalence 
classes are explicitly matched through the connected tables. 
The final output is 2-anonymous by Lemma 3. 
Theorem 5: MiRaCle, when given an input database MR 
and appropriate parameters, produces a k-anonymous data- 
base MR*. 
PROOF. The skeleton of MiRaCle is a 
clustering-based k-anonymity algorithm. The 
only change MiRaCle introduces is to call 
Anonymi~e (a , ,~~z=~~  PT', avip2=vz P T ~ ,  MR1, MR2) 
lines 9 and 15 for the anonymization of two private trees 
rooted at vl and vg. Here each private tree is actually 
a cluster representative for multiple trees. Nodes in each 
representative tree may have values from higher domains 
in the given dgh structure (values such as "Science", 
"Social"). However, such difference does not have any 
effect on the execution o f  the anonymize function since 
the generalization function gen is well-defined also 
on higher domains (gen("Science","Math")="Science"). 
The MR* database returned by the anonymization 
function will still be anonymous with respect to both 
trees. Specifically i f  vl E MR1 and v2 E MR2 are m 
and n anonymous vip representations respectively then 
vg E MR*=anonymize(vl, v2, MR1, M R ~ )  is an m + n 
anonymous representation. At the end of the MiRaCle 
algorithm, every cluster C has more than k elements and 
the associated cluster representative uc is a ICI-anonymous 
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representative. v~ for each C is reproduced for every 
entity within C (so that they form an equivalence class). 
This ensures k-anonymity. So Theorem 4 also implies the 
correctness of Theorem 5. 
V. Experiments 
To compare the flexibility of MiRaCle, MiRaCleX and 
single-tabIe (bitmap) approach, we conducted experiments on 
synthetic data structured as in Table 11. We created 1000 
random students; to each student we assigned 1 obligatory, 
2 or 3 technical elective, and 2 or 3 non-technical electives 
from 22 courses. Each course had 2, 3 or 4 textbooks to 
choose from. The distribution of courses and books to students 
was designed to match Bilkent University's undergraduate 
program requirements. We ran MiRaCle and MiRaCleX on 
the original database and the CDGH anonymization algorithm 
[15] on a bitmap transformation of the database. We fixed 
the cluster limit to be 150. To evaluate the utility of the 
k Value 
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anonymizations, we used the adaptations of the LM and DM 
cost metrics defined in Section 11. 
To observe how MiRaCle and MiRaCleX algorithms ad- 
dress weaknesses given in items 2 and 5 of Section 111-C, 
we first assumed that the dataset is incomplete as described 
in Section 111-C. In Figure 4, we graph the change in LM 
costs of three anonymizations with respect to different k. 
Both MiRaCle and MiRaCleX are 30-40% less costly than 
the Bitmap algorithm. Figure 5 supports the same relation 
for a fixed k = 50 but with varying threshold (clustering 
input parameter). Figure 6 shows the DM costs for the 
algorithms. MiRaCle and MiRaCleX slightly outperform the 
Bitmap algorithm on the DM metric. 
We next conducted experiments assuming that the dataset 
is complete. LM is not a suitable metric for comparison here 
since it does not take into account tuples that are not in 
the dataset. Figure 7 shows the DM cost results. We see 
that all three algorithms have similar costs and there is no 
obvious winner. The MiRaCle algorithm loses its flexibility 
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to the fact that entity anonymizations of MiRaCle are not 
optimal which means there are cases where Bitmap approach 
is better w.r.t. precision. However, in Figure 8, we plot the 
execution time required to run both algorithms on a 1.66GHz 
Intel Core Duo machine. Consistent with the disscusion in 
items 6 and 8 of Section 111-C, MiRaCleX outperforms both 
algorithms by a factor of at least 3 (This is true even though 
we ignored the time spent to convert the dataset to the bitmap 
format for bitmap anonymizations.) It should be noted that 
execution times in all conducted experiments show similar 
behavior. One important observation here is that MiRaCleX 
have better or comparable utilization when compared to 
MiRaCle and  itm map algorithms in all of the experiments 
however MiRaCleX is much faster than both algorithms. This 
implies that underlying heuristic works for the experimental 
dataset. 
VI. Conclusions 
We have shown that in a full database setting, single 
table k-anonymity algorithms either fail to protect privacy, 
or overly reduce the utility of the data. We proposed a 
more flexible anonymity algorithm for snowflake schemas. 
Support for arbitrary schemas with multiple private entities 
can be considered as future work. Other proposed extensions 
to k-anonymity such as weak k-anonymity [2], &diversity 
[13], t-closeness [12], 6-presence [I41 application specific k- 
anonymity [3], distributed k-anonymity [22], and personalized 
anonymity [20] face similar challenges when considering 
multi-relational k-anonymity. 
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